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 Abstract 
A consensus algorithm is the core of a blockchain, a technology that allows the development of                
flexible trust relationships in distributed systems. 
 
This project aims to design and develop a consensus algorithm for IPchain, a blockchain that               
will act as a security layer for the inter-domain routing protocol BGP. 
 
To do it, we will study the most relevant consensus algorithm at the time, and use the acquired                  
knowledge to  build a customized consensus algorithm that fits the needs of IPchain. 
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 1. Context and scope of the project 
1.1 Context 
1.1.1 Introduction 
This project is a Bachelor Thesis developed for the Bachelor Degree in Informatics Engineering              
taken at Facultat d’Informàtica de Barcelona (FIB) of Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya            
(UPC).  
 
The internet is a network formed by a lot of different networks, which are called domains. 
A domain is a group of computers that are managed by the same organization (e.g: google,                
amazon, …). If we try to visit a website hosted in a computer in a different domain, we won’t                   
be able to visit it unless we have Internet connection. This happens because our Internet               
Service Provider (ISP) provides us access to other domains through inter-domain routing.            
Inter-domain routing means that a computer can tell which domains it has to go through in                
order to reach a specific domain. 
 
The inter-domain routing protocol used nowadays is known as BGP (Border Gateway Protocol).             
BGP divides the Internet into Autonomous System (AS), networks managed by network            
operators that contain one or more domains. Thanks to BGP, an AS can announce to other AS’s                 
the domains it contains, but also receive this information from other AS’s. With this              
information, each AS can create a table indicating the AS where each domain is found. 
 
The BGP has been working on the Internet since 1994, but some security issues have been                
raised since. BGP is not a secure protocol, and an accidental misconfiguration by the network               
operator or the modification of AS announcements by a malicious attacker controlling an AS              
can wreak havoc on the Internet. We can find several examples of this kind of attack [1-3]. 
 
IPchain is a solution to BGP security flaws. It’s a blockchain that stores allocations and               
delegations of IP addresses with the aim of easing the deployment of secure inter-domain              
routing systems, which prevent traffic redirections [4]. 
 
Blockchain is a technology that leverages cryptography and distributed ledger technology (DLT)            
to provide its users of flexible trust models, overriding the necessity of a central authority. 
 
A consensus algorithm is the core of a blockchain, specifying how all the correct nodes in the                 
chain (nodes that aren’t malfunctioning or have malicious intentions) will achieve the same             
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 state. In other words, it’s the algorithm that will allow the blockchain to make decisions               
without depending on a central authority. 
 
This project aims to study different consensus algorithms, reasoning which is the most             
appropriate for IPchain. Once a consensus algorithm has been chosen, it will be implemented              
on the current IPchain codebase and tested to see how it performs. 
 
1.1.2 Stakeholders 
Because IPchain improves the current inter-domain routing protocol of the Internet, it affects             
several people: 
 
- Network operators: ​BGP configuration is hard, tedious and error-prone. It’s also a            
juicy target for a malicious attacker. A single misconfiguration could leak to huge             
problems. IPchain can drastically reduce the impact of both, providing a safety            
network for network operators. 
 
- Internet users: ​Users will be benefited of the implementation of secure inter-domain            
routing, as this would result in a safer Internet. 
 
- Cisco Systems: ​Cisco Systems will be benefited because it will be able to produce and               
sell routers which have IPchain capabilities, increasing its market and competitivity. 
 
- Computer Science Community: ​Blockchain has been severely criticized because it          
hasn’t been able to live to the expectations. It’s adoption rate is slow, and we have yet                 
to see a blockchain-based solution that provides real-value. We expect IPchain to            
become an example of success on the usage of blockchain. 
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 1.2 State-of-the-art 
1.2.1 RPKI 
It should be noted that the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is already aware of these                
problems and has designed a solution to inter-domain routing security. This solution is the              
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [5], which relies on a central authority that records              
the legitimate owners of IP prefixes and AS numbers (the identifier of an AS). 
 
But something must be wrong because adoption rate of RPKI is quite slow. On Sept 2018,                
~88000 AS were identified[6], but only ~9000 are protected by the RPKI [7], a 10% of all the AS. 
The reason of this has been analyzed by the literature [8-9] but can be summarized in: 
● Central authorities hold control of RPKI resources, but IP addresses are a            
critical asset of RPKI users, and they would like a higher degree of control              
while maintaining security provided by RPKI. 
● PKI are hard to manage, require trained staff and financial investment. 
● RPKI expose business relationships through peering agreements. 
1.2.2 Papers on the topic 
Similar projects have been discussed on the literature. We will discuss them in this section. 
 
The Internet Blockchain: A Distributed, Tamper-Resistant Transaction Framework for the          
Interne​t [10] argues that the internet needs a distributed and tamper-resistant resource            
management framework which cannot be subverted by any single entity, and the best possible              
implementation is blockchain. Thus, they propose to use blockchain to secure BGP and DNS. 
 
BGPCoin: A Trustworthy Blockchain-based Resource Management Solution for BGP Security          
[11] plans to do the same thing that IPchain does, but while the paper was released on 2017,                  
nothing has been heard off BGPCoin since. Their implementation was going to be based on               
Ethereum, which provides less flexibility as the consensus algorithm can’t be modified to adapt              
to the needs of BGP security. 
 
An experiment in distributed Internet address management using blockchains ​[12] presents           
InBlock, an experiment to use blockchain for the validation of domains in BGP. It’s supposed to                
be a starting point to explore the technology and inform future directions in this area. It’s also                 
based on Ethereum. 
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 Blockchain-based Public Key Infrastructure for Inter-Domain Secure Routing ​[13] presents SBTM           
(Secure Blockchain), a general and flexible management framework for inter-domain routing           
based on a blockchain protocol. This project has the same objective as IPchain but is               
completely based on proof of work (which is known to have several problems). Its aim is to                 
actually test the use of blockchain on inter-domain routing security instead of looking for the               
best consensus algorithm. 
1.2.3 Route Monitoring Services 
Some companies such as BGPMon [14] and ThousandEyes [15] sell subscription-based           
solutions that provide real-time feedback. These companies maintain one or several nodes            
distributed over the Internet that receive and review BGP information. When a user is              
subscribed, the company will track the user’s domain information on their network nodes and              
if an incoherence is detected, they will warn the user, giving details about the problem. 
 
While this is a functional solution, it has a few problems: 
● Instead of preventing problems, it warns about them once they have happened. Even             
if the problem is fixed fast, it could take a while to propagate through the Internet,                
potentially resulting in losses for the affected parts. 
● User security depends directly on a third party, which can be compromised, change the              
way their information is gathered, etc. It’s preferable to be able to handle security by               
yourself. 
1.2.4 Internet Routing Registry 
The Internet Routing Registry [16] is a globally distributed database that contains routing             
information. Its purpose is to ensure the stability and consistency of Internet routing by              
sharing information between network operators. Network operators, who are allowed          
modification of the IRR (Internet Routing Registry), must update the information of their own              
networks manually so it reflects the status of their AS routing configuration. IRR is mostly used                
to validate information provided by other AS. 
 
Some problems with this solution are:  
● It’s tedious because information update and validation must be performed manually.  
● It’s not secure, because a network operator (or someone with its credentials) can             
upload invalid information (either accidentally or with malicious intentions). 
● It doesn’t prevent routing problems, but instead helps to debug them once they have              
already happened. 
 
Sometimes network operators use phone calls between them in order to compliment            
validation through IRR. 
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 1.3 Scope of the project 
1.3.1 Objectives 
As it’s been noted earlier, the objective of this project is the development of the most                
appropriate consensus algorithm for IPchain, a blockchain solution for inter-domain routing           
security.  To do so, the following steps will be followed: 
 
● Study the currently known, tested and proved consensus algorithms that are used in             
blockchain solutions, either in research or by companies. Identify the trade-offs,           
advantages and disadvantages of every consensus algorithm. Once all representative          
consensus algorithm have been studied, determine which one fulfills the requirements           
of IPchain the most. 
● Once a consensus algorithm has been chosen, study the existing IPchain codebase and             
implement it on IPchain. We will implement an extensible module that manages            
consensus of the blockchain node following the principles of software engineering. It            
must be possible to easily add a new consensus algorithm, in case a new and more                
interesting solution appears in the future. 
● Test the implemented consensus algorithm, verifying it works correctly on real           
emulation of the BGP protocol and the non-functional requirements are fulfilled           
(block-time, performance, etc…). We must also ensure that there are no bugs or             
unexpected behaviors.  
1.3.2 Possible obstacles 
Some obstacles can appear during the development of the project, affecting its temporal             
planning: 
 
● Chosen consensus algorithm is hard or impossible to implement with our resources. If             
we find this obstacle, we will evaluate time left and complexity of the algorithm and               
decide if we implement a simplified but functional version of the algorithm or we              
provide a theoretical explanation of the algorithm on the project report. 
● We don’t have enough resources to emulate a real case scenario of the BGP protocol.               
In this case we will have to generate a representative fragment of the AS networking               
and apply the BGP protocol in this subnet. The results taken will have to be               
extrapolated to the real case scenario. 
● Problems with used computer and loss of information. In order to avoid this problem              
we will use online services and store the code in a Version Control System (VCS). 
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 1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Development methodology 
Given the fact that we are working on an unknown project and we don’t know what problems                 
we’ll have, we’ve decided to use an agile methodology. That’s why we’ve decided to use               
Kanban. We will have a backlog with all the tasks that need to be completed and we will have                   
weekly meetings to check and discuss the development of the project, making changes if              
required. 
 
We will keep track of the current status of the project and compare it to the project planning                  
explained in section 2, reasoning how far are we from completing the objectives of the project                
and, if needed, readjusting the time dedication of every task.  
For example, if we have exhausted the assigned time of consensus algorithms we will look at                
the solutions that have been studied and decide if we use on of those or dedicate some more                  
time to researching consensus algorithms, which will have to be sacrificed from a different task               
(such as testing). 
1.4.2 Used tools 
We will use Trello to manage the backlog and the time dedication of all the tasks, checking on                  
the weekly meeting how far are we from our objectives and making task changes if required. 
We will also use Github as a VCS where we will store and manage the code.  
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 2. Project planning 
2.1 Task description 
2.1.1 Project management 
When developing a Bachelor’s Thesis, the faculty requires its students to course a project              
management subject called Gestió de Projectes (GEP). The focus of this subject is to guide the                
students on the planning of the project, helping them specify what the problem is and how will                 
it be solved. 
 
The deliverables of this subject and its time estimations are: 
 
● Context and scope of the project (12 hours) 
● Project planning (8 hours) 
● Budget and sustainability (8 hours) 
● Review of bachelor’s thesis competences (10 hours) 
● Oral presentation and final document (20 hours) 
 
The expected dedication of the student for GEP is 75 hours, while the deliverables have been                
estimated to take 58 hours. There are 17 hours remaining that will be used to study the                 
material required for every deliverable. 
 
In order to complete this task, we will require: a computer, Google Drive (to store and edit the                  
deliverables online), Libre Office (to complete the rubrics associated with every deliverable),            
Firefox (to visualize websites and PDFs) and Atenea (to upload the deliverables).  
2.1.2 Study of Proof of Work algorithms 
We will study algorithms that rely on proof of work to achieve consensus on blockchains. This                
kind of consensus is very interesting because it’s the first that achieved decentralized             
consensus. It’s mainly known for its application in Bitcoin, but has some drawbacks that might               
make it unappealing for our use case. We will have to study these drawbacks and look for                 
modifications of classic proof of work that solve those drawbacks that could matter to us. This                
task will require 20 hours of work, and a computer with access to the Internet will be required                  
to complete it. 
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 2.1.3 Study of Proof of Stake algorithms 
We will study algorithms that rely on proof of stake to achieve consensus on blockchains. This                
is the kind of consensus that is expected to fix the problems of proof of work. They are based                   
on a different premise, and because of this, they have a different set of drawbacks. We have to                  
keep in mind this kind of algorithms haven’t seen a lot of real world usage yet, and because of                   
this, there are a lot of different implementations with different trade-offs. This task will require               
30 hours of work, and a computer with access to the Internet will be required to complete it. 
2.1.4 Research of lesser-known consensus algorithms 
Although proof of work and proof of stake are the most known consensus algorithms, they are                
thought for blockchains that handle cryptocurrencies. Blockchain is a solution that is being             
tested in different areas and other solutions might exist to the consensus problem. In this task,                
we will explore those solutions. This task will require 30 hours of work, and a computer with                 
access to the Internet will be required to complete it. 
2.1.5 Decision of best consensus algorithm 
Once we consider we have researched enough on consensus algorithms, we will have to              
compare all the solutions and decide which one are we going to use. We won’t only consider                 
the one that fits the best, but we will also have to keep in mind robustness (how reliable the                   
algorithm is and how much has it been tested), complexity of the solution and flexibility (how                
well can it scale). This task will require 20 hours of work and a computer. 
2.1.6 Implementation of consensus algorithm 
After deciding the consensus algorithm we want to use, we will have to implement it on                
IPchain. Because a code base already exists, we will have to study the code first and decide                 
how to modify it following the principles of Software Engineering. This task will require 150               
hours of work, and we will require: Docker to create containers that act as blockchain nodes, a                 
computer that will host the blockchain nodes, a computer where the project will be developed               
and a Git server (Github) where the code will be hosted. 
2.1.7 Test of consensus algorithm 
Once the consensus algorithm has been implemented, we will have to verify that it fulfills the                
IPchain requirements. We will need to initialize a blockchain and add enough nodes to              
replicate a real case scenario. Then, we will have to gather several statistics (such as block                
insertion time, tolerance to malicious nodes,…) and reason if they are good enough. This task                
will require 150 hours of work and will require: Docker to deploy containers that act as                
blockchain nodes, four server computers that will host the blockchain nodes and a computer              
to monitor the blockchain and gather statistics. 
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 2.1.8 Elaboration of the report and defense preparation 
Once the project is completed and tested, all the work that has been done must be                
documented in a project report, which will be used to defend the project in front of an                 
evaluation committee composed of professors of FIB. This task will require 50 hours of work               
and will require a computer with access to the Internet, because Google Drive will be used to                 
elaborate and host the document online. 
2.2 Time estimation and task sequencing 
2.2.1 Time estimation per task 
 
Task Estimated hours 
Project management 75 
Study of Proof of Work algorithms 20 
Study of Proof of Stake algorithms 30 
Research of lesser-known consensus 
algorithms 
30 
Decision of best consensus algorithm 20 
Implementation of consensus algorithm 150 
Test of consensus algorithm 150 
Elaboration of the report and defense 
preparation 
50 
Total 525 
 
2.2.2 Task sequencing and dependencies 
 
Task Predecessor task 
Project management - 
Study of Proof of Work algorithms - 
Study of Proof of Stake algorithms - 
Research of lesser-known consensus 
algorithms 
- 
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 Decision of best consensus algorithm - Study of Proof of Work algorithms 
- Study of Proof of Stake algorithms 
- Research of lesser-known consensus 
algorithms 
Implementation of consensus algorithm Decision of best consensus algorithm 
Test of consensus algorithm Implementation of consensus algorithm 
Elaboration of the report and defense 
preparation 
Test of consensus algorithm 
 
2.2.3 Gantt chart 
The following Gantt chart shows the project planning and the expected completion time, as              
well as the task dependencies. 
 
 
 
2.3 Alternatives and action plan 
2.3.1 Implementation of consensus algorithm is harder than expected 
Because consensus algorithms are a trending topic, there is a lot of research papers in the                
area, but usually research papers explain the theory but don’t append the implementation. It              
is possible that we decide to implement a consensus algorithm we discovered through a              
research paper and find some unexpected complexity we don’t know how to approach. In this               
case, we would have to contact the authors of the paper to discuss their solution and ask for                  
some guidance, which could delay the project a bit. This complication would cause a one/two               
weeks delay (30 to 50 hours), depending on the time it takes us to reach the authors of the                   
paper. 
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 2.3.2 Consensus algorithm doesn’t behave as expected 
Because some consensus algorithms can be very experimental, it’s possible that once we start              
testing the implemented consensus algorithm we discover it doesn’t behave as expected. In             
that case, we wouldn’t have time to implement a different algorithm, so we would try to fix                 
the one that is already implemented. If we realize we won’t be able to fix it in time, we will                    
continue the project, documenting what went wrong, why, if it’s possible to fix it and how                
would we do it. This complication would cause a delay of one/two weeks. 
2.3.3 Discovery of better consensus algorithm after implementation has started 
Given the amount of information about consensus algorithms, it’s easy to overlook or miss              
information. It’s also possible that a new consensus algorithm is revealed while we are              
developing this project. 
The discovery of new consensus algorithms won’t affect us unless we have started the              
implementation. In that case, we would evaluate time left and how close are we from               
completing the implementation. If we think we have enough time, we will switch to the new                
consensus algorithm, otherwise we will simply comment it on the project report. This             
complication will only be approved if it doesn’t cause a delay bigger than two weeks. 
2.3.4 Not enough server computers available to replicate real case scenario 
While the amount of Autonomous System on the Internet isn’t specially big, we don’t really               
know how computationally intensive will the consensus algorithm be. It’s possible that we             
don’t have enough computers to emulate a real case scenario. In that case, we will spin up as                  
many nodes as possible and gather our statistics. Then, we will extrapolate them to the               
amount of nodes we were expecting to use. This complication would cause a 5 days delay. 
2.4 Project completion 
The project must be presented at the end of January. As we can see on the Gantt chart at                   
section 2.2.3, we have enough time to complete the project safely. We also have enough spare                
time which would be used in case we had any unexpected problem. 
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 3. Budget and sustainability 
3.1 Self-assessment 
Before studying the assigned material for GEP, I wouldn’t pay a lot of attention to social and                 
economical sustainability of the projects I worked on. I can’t say the same about              
environmental sustainability because it’s a very trending topic lately on technology projects,            
and it’s something I had already thought about on this project. Now I feel like I know what I                   
have to think about when taking care of the sustainability of a project, and I can make a decent                   
analysis. 
 
Regarding environmental sustainability, I think I can easily identify key characteristics that            
define the environmental impact of a project and provide ideas and solutions that make the               
project more sustainable. I have also learned how to measure the sustainability of a project. 
 
Regarding social sustainability, I can now take into account the impact that a project can have                
in society. I find it easier to think about how it benefits people, and I think I need to work on                     
reasoning if it can be detrimental for any affected part, and possible misuses of the project. I                 
also have difficulties on deciding if a project will improve the well-being of society when taking                
pros and cons in consideration. 
 
Regarding economical sustainability, I’ve learned how to measure the cost of implementing a             
project, while taking both human and material resources in consideration. I have also gained              
perspective on how uncertainty affects the budget of a project. I need to think more on                
improving the viability of projects during their useful lives. 
 
Overall, I think I have achieved the objectives of GEP and if I keep developing these new                 
acquired abilities I will be able to develop truly sustainable projects. 
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 3.2 Cost identification 
3.2.1 Human resources 
Role Hours of work Salary/Hour Estimated cost 
Project author 525 10 5250 € 
Project director 100 16 1600 € 
Project codirector 100 16 1600 € 
Total Cost   8450 € 
 
The hours of work of the project author were calculated previously in this document. The               
hours of work of both directors have been calculated assuming 8 hours of work per week: they                 
will devote 4 hours to the weekly meeting and 4 hours to personal research. 
3.2.2 Indirect costs 
 
 
Product Units Price/Unit Percentage of 
use 
Estimated cost 
Internet 4 months 40 €/month 40% 64 € 
Electricity 4 months 50 €/month 30% 60 € 
Local 4 months 300 €/month 100% 300 € 
Transport 20 days 20 €/day 100% 400 € 
Total    1724 € 
 
 
● Transport: The author of the project has to take a RENFE train to commute from Reus                
to Barcelona for the weekly meeting. Metro fees have also been added. 
● Local: It will be supplied by the Departament d’Arquitectura de Computadors of FIB. 
● Electricity and Internet: Based on the fees paid by the project author, applying an              
approximate percentage of resource dedication. 
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 3.2.3 Direct costs 
In this section, we will detail the resources required to develop every task defined in the                
previously in this document. 
 
Task Units Price/Unit Useful 
life 
Amortization Price 
Project Management      
Laptop 1 600 4 years (600/7680) * 75 5.86 
Google Drive 1 - - 0 0 
Libre Office 1 - - 0 0 
Mozilla Firefox 1 - - 0 0 
Study of Proof of Work 
algorithms 
     
Laptop 1 600 4 years (600/7680) * 20 1.56 
Study of Proof of Stake 
algorithms 
     
Laptop 1 600 4 years (600/7680) * 30 2.34 
Research of lesser-known 
consensus algorithms 
     
Laptop 1 600 4 years (600/7680) * 30 2.34 
Decision of best 
consensus algorithm 
     
Laptop 1 600 4 years (600/7680) * 20 1.56 
Implementation of 
consensus algorithm 
     
Laptop 1 600 4 years (600/7680) * 150 11.72 
Server computer 1 - - 0 0 
Github 1 - - 0 0 
Docker 1 - - 0 0 
Test of consensus 
algorithm 
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 Task Units Price/Unit Useful 
life 
Amortization Price 
Laptop 1 600 4 years (600/7680) * 150 11.72 
Server computer 1 - - 0 0 
AWS EC2 General 
Purpose Large 
60 0.17 - - 10.2 
Docker 1 - - 0 0 
Elaboration of the report 
and defense preparation 
     
Laptop 1 600 4 years (600/7680) * 50 3.91 
Google Drive 1 - - 0 0 
Total     51.21 
 
Amortization is based on working hours per year, with 40 work hours per week and 4 vacation                 
weeks per year. The formula used is: 40 (hours per week) x (52 (weeks in a year) - 4 (vacation                    
weeks)). 
 
A server computer will be provided by the Departament d’Arquitectura de Computadors of FIB.              
It has already been amortized, so it doesn’t have any cost. 
 
Three more server computers will be required, which will be acquired through Amazon Web              
Services. We will need each server for 20 hours, so we will need 60 hours of Amazon Web                  
Services EC2 time. AWS is paid per hour. 
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 3.2.4 Contingency 
Given the fact that blockchain is a hot topic and a lot of our project is based on research                   
papers, there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the project. Because of this, we have assumed a                 
contingency of 15%. 
 
Concept Cost Contingency 
Human resources 8450 € 1267.5 €  
Indirect costs 1724 € 258.6 € 
Direct costs 51.21 € 7.68 € 
Total 10225.21 € 1533.63 € 
 
3.2.5 Incidents 
 
● Two weeks delay: In the project planning we mentioned the possibility of certain             
problems and its impact on the project. The average delay time was of one/two weeks.               
We calculate the cost of this incident using the salary described in section 3.2.1. The               
probability of this incident is 25%. 
● Computer fault: If the laptop is broken during the development of the project, it will               
have to be replaced by a new one. The probability of this incident is 5%. 
 
 
Incident Probability Units Price Cost 
Two weeks delay  25% 54 hours /author 
8 hours/director 
10 €/h 
16 €/h 
175 € 
 
Computer fault 5% 1 600 € 30 € 
Total    205 € 
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 3.2.6 Budget 
 
This is the final budget, adding all the costs previously described. 
 
Concept Cost 
Human resources 8450 € 
Indirect costs 1724 € 
Direct costs 51.21 € 
Contingency 1533.63 € 
Incidents 205 € 
Total 11962,84 € 
 
3.3 Sustainability 
It will be studied answering some questions proposed by the GEP teachers. 
3.3.1 Environmental sustainability 
● Have you estimated the environmental impact of the project? Did you plan to             
minimize its impact, for example, by reusing resources?  
We will use a laptop (0.07 kWh) for 525h and servers (0.15 kWh) for a total of 80h.                  
That’s a total of 48.75 kWh. No measures have been taken to reduce the impact, as the                 
amount of resources used is very small already. 
 
●  How is currently solved the problem that you want to address (state of the art)? 
The problem is addressed in two different ways. The first way is through the              
maintenance of a big database known as IRR that contains a lot of information              
regarding inter-domain routing. The second way is through companies that provide           
monitoring services, sending alerts to network operators when a suspicious behavior is            
detected. 
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 ● How will your solution improve the environment with respect other existing            
solutions? 
It will reduce the amount of operative computers, as neither the monitor servers nor              
the IRR database will be needed, while the amount of operational computers will be              
the same. These operational computers will slightly increase their computational load           
due to the consensus algorithm and the route verification. Overall, the amount of             
consumed energy will be reduced. 
3.3.2 Economic sustainability 
● Have you estimated the cost of developing the project (human and material            
resources)?  
Yes, the estimation can be found on section 3.2. In order to reduce the cost, we have                 
chosen cheap AWS servers and reduced the amount of hours that directors will work              
on the project. All in all, we believe this is a cheap project given the benefits it                 
provides. 
● How are currently solved economic issues (costs...) related to the problem that you             
want to address (state of the art)? 
Monitor services provided by specialized companies are subscription-based, so the          
cost of the servers is paid with the benefits obtained from client subscription. The IRR               
is maintained by the Regional Internet registry (RIR) and its costs are paid with the               
income obtained through the membership fee of all the Local Internet Registries (LIR). 
 
● How will your solution improve economic issues (costs ...) with respect other existing             
solutions? Since the amount of operational computers and computational load will be            
reduced, less energy will be wasted and the costs of the solution will be reduced.               
Because the system is decentralized and there is no server, the cost of using IPchain               
will be paid directly by their users in the form of consumed energy. 
3.3.3 Social sustainability 
● How do you think that will the development of this project contribute to you? 
The development of this project will be my first contribution to a research paper. The               
experience of contributing to it could change my career (orienting it to research             
contributions). 
 
● How is currently solved the problem that you want to address (state of the art)? 
The problem is addressed in two different ways, as explained earlier. The IRR solution              
requires manual updating of the BGP information by the network operator. The            
monitoring services require integration and dependency of a third-party. 
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 ● How will your solution improve the quality of life (social dimension) with respect other               
existing solutions?  
It will improve the quality of life of network operators, reducing their workload. They              
won’t have to update their BGP information manually on IRR nor depend on a              
third-party. Also, the impact of a misconfiguration or a successful malicious attack will             
be severely reduced, thus the urgency of a fix will be decreased and so will the                
network operator required availability. 
 
● Is there a real need for the project?  
Yes. Network operators are disposed to interact with third party and manually update             
the IRR in order to ease the debugging of inter-domain routing problems. This project              
will make their job easier and severely reduce the impact of any mistake. Currently              
inter-domain routing problems are more frequent than desired and any misbehaviour           
of the BGP protocol will result in a lot of trouble and extra work hours for network                 
operators. 
 
3.3.4 Sustainability matrix 
The sustainability matrix obtained from the results of the previous sections is: 
 
Environmental Economic Social 
8/10 8/10 9/10 
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 4. Technical background 
Before diving into the technical part of the project, we think it is interesting to give our                 
definition of blockchain and consensus algorithm. 
 
The amount of projects claiming to use blockchain technologies is rising, but the word itself is                
becoming a buzzword due to the amount of misinformation surrounding it. No one seems to               
agree on which qualities are essential in order to call something a blockchain. 
Bitcoin is a widely-known cryptocurrency that is considered the first blockchain, and we             
believe it’s implementation perfectly adjusts to the term, so we are gonna use it to explain                
what blockchain actually means. 
 
Since Bitcoin is expected to be used as a cryptocurrency, the system will have to keep track of                  
the amount of currency owned by every user, as well as update it when a transaction between                 
users occurs, just like a bank would do. This record is what we understand as state of the                  
system. 
 
The first thing we need to know, is that in Bitcoin there is no central machine maintaining the                  
state of the system; instead, a distributed ledger is used. What this means is that the system                 
contains an undetermined amount of nodes, and each one will have a private copy of the state                 
that we’ll be maintained by itself. The nodes will be interconnected using a peer-to-peer (P2P)               
network, and a ​consensus algorithm ​will be used so the nodes can agree on how to update                 
their state. This kind of system is known as Replicated State Machine. 
 
When users send transactions to the system, these are broadcasted through P2P. Every node              
will receive the transaction, verify that it’s valid (validate sender with public-key cryptography,             
check the balance of the sender,…) and store it in a list of transactions pending to be applied.                   
The list of transactions can be different for every node, so we need a way to know which                  
transactions are being handled when nodes try to reach consensus, otherwise nodes could             
apply the same transaction twice. This is where blocks come into play. 
 
A block is a package that is created by a node and contains interesting information. For this                 
explanation we will focus on two fields: a list of transactions and a hash of a block. The                  
transactions from the list are validated and deemed correct by the node, and the hash of a                 
block is the hash of the last block considered valid by the node. This hash links all valid blocks                   
all the way back until the first one, resembling a chain, and that’s where the term ​blockchain                 
comes from (Figure 1). There is only one special block, the first block. Since it can’t point to any                   
other block, it is usually hardcoded and it’s called genesis block. Every other block will have the                 
same structure. 
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Figure 1: Simplified Bitcoin Block Chain 
 
Who creates a block, when does he do it and how do other nodes accept a block is defined by                    
the consensus algorithm, so we won’t explain it here. All we need to know right now is that                  
eventually, all nodes will receive a certain block which by the protocol standards is correct, and                
they can either accept it or refuse it. 
 
If a node accepts a block, it will remove the transactions included in the transaction list of the                  
block and apply them to its current state. If he doesn’t accept the block, he won’t be able to                   
propose to or accept blocks from nodes that have accepted it, as the hash contained in that                 
block will be seen as invalid. 
 
When a new node connects to the network, it needs to get the current state, but as we have                   
seen, it is possible to have different states for the same blockchain (it can have forks), so the                  
implementation must provide a way to decide the best of two chains. This is usually also                
related to the consensus algorithm. In Bitcoin’s case, the longest chain is picked. 
 
Using blocks makes the system transparent, since the chain contains all the transactions that              
have happened since the launch of the system. Anyone can revise any transaction and validate               
the current state of the system. 
 
It also makes the system tamper-resistant, because modifying a transaction in a block implies              
modifying all the blocks from the one that includes the transaction to the most recent one.                
Even though block creation is defined by the consensus algorithm, it usually takes a big amount                
of time. Because of this, in Bitcoin transactions aren’t confirmed until the block they belong to                
is a certain number of blocks deep. Blockchains are not immutable, but tampering with them               
requires a huge effort. 
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As a conclusion, we understand a blockchain as a system where transactions are gathered in               
blocks that are secured into the chain using cryptography, and it is designed to be               
tamper-resistant and produce immutable records. That said, there are some examples of            
distributed ledgers where transactions are not organized in blocks. 
 
The most interesting part of blockchains are the way they can allow distributed systems to               
reach consensus without the presence of a trusted party. In a way, they are a tool that allows                  
systems to express customized and flexible trust relationships. We understand a consensus            
algorithm as the protocol that lies at the core of a blockchain and defines the policies of                 
creation and insertion of blocks in the blockchain, driving forward the system. 
 
5. Researched consensus algorithms 
In this section we will explain the consensus algorithms that we have studied. There are a lot of                  
algorithms out there, and they are usually complex pieces of technology that require a certain               
amount of time to fully understand them and the problem they solve. 
Because of this, we were not able to study as many algorithms as we would have liked to, and                   
limited ourselves to representative examples of every type of consensus. 
Since IPchain aims to be a public blockchain, we haven’t studied consensus algorithms used in               
permissioned or private blockchains (where blocks can only be created by a select group of               
nodes). 
5.1 Proof-of-work 
Proof-of-work (PoW) is the most popular algorithm because it is currently used by both Bitcoin               
and Ethereum, the most popular cryptocurrencies and blockchain implementations. It was first            
described by the Bitcoin whitepaper [17]. ​While they both implement PoW in a different way,               
the basis of their consensus is the same. 
5.1.1 Explanation 
In PoW, the consensus is driven by complex computational problems. In this model, a node can                
create a block whenever he wants, but there’s one condition that the block must fulfill in order                 
to be accepted by everyone else: the hash of the block must be under a certain number, the                  
target. This model is used because generating the correct hash can be incredibly hard, but it’s                
also very easy to validate. 
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 Since the output of a hash is unpredictable, the only thing the node can do to create a block                   
with a hash under the target is randomly create blocks until he gets the desired hash. In order                  
to simplify this process, blocks incorporate a 4-byte file called nonce. All nodes have to do once                 
they have created a block is increment the nonce of the block until the hash is under the                  
target. Because there’s a chance no nonce value provides the desired hash, nodes can also               
alter the timestamp field to find a valid combination. The process of finding the correct hash is                 
called mining. 
 
The target is a variable number, and is used to enforce a block time. The block time is the                   
average time that it takes to insert a new block in the blockchain. The target will be directly                  
influenced by the insert time of the last block: if it took longer than expected the target will be                   
increased, while if the insertion time took too short, the target will be reduced. 
 
Block time is a variable defined by the developers of the system. Using shorter block times                
means transactions will be processed faster, but the blockchain will be formed by more blocks,               
which will make the blockchain heavier to process. Using higher block times decreases the              
probability of two nodes creating a valid block at the same time and makes creation of fake                 
blocks even harder. 
 
Since insertion of blocks is so costly in PoW blockchains, when comparing two chains in order                
to decide which one is valid, nodes will always pick the longest one, because it is the one that                   
has been harder to compute. There’s an underlying assumption here: as long as there are more                
well-behaved than ill-behaved nodes, the longest chain will always be correct. 
 
The result of the PoW algorithm is that approximately every “block time”, one node will be                
elected to create and propose a block. 
 
5.1.2 Pros 
1) PoW systems are the most tested ones in the blockchain ecosystem. Bitcoin has been              
around since 2008 and the results have been satisfactory.  
2) The cost of solving complex computational problems to create blocks deters users            
from behaving incorrectly, since they might waste a lot of resources without obtaining             
any result. Blocks will still be created even if there are no transactions pending to be                
processed, so rewriting the chain is very costly. A malicious party would have to create               
blocks faster than the entire system in order to rewrite the transaction history, and              
they would still require a lot of time if they want to rewrite a deep enough block. 
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 5.1.3 Cons 
1) The main drawback of PoW is the amount of energy it consumes. Given the public and                
distributed nature of Bitcoin, it is very hard to get conclusive data, but some studies               
have pointed that it may consume as much energy as Ireland [18]. 
2) Because of the assumption that 51% of the nodes are well-behaved, it would be              
possible by a resourceful party to acquire enough computational power to affect the             
regular functioning of the system. This is called a 51% attack. 
3) Block times in PoW are not constant. This happens because block time is decided              
randomly. Although improbable, a node could generate a valid hash in seconds or             
days. This can be annoying for the users of the blockchain because transactions could              
take a long time to reflect in the state of the system. 
4) It isn’t as decentralized as initially thought, since actors can invest in better equipment              
in order to build more blocks than others. 
5.2 Proof-of-stake 
Proof-of-stake (PoS) was first proposed in a Bitcoin forum [19], and has been adopted since by                
some cryptocurrencies such as Peercoin, Nxt, … 
Ethereum, the most popular blockchain after Bitcoin, is planning to migrate to PoS eventually. 
It is seen as the most mainstream solution to the problems of PoW. 
5.2.1 Explanation 
PoS tries to replicate the behaviour of PoW while removing the inefficiency of mining. If the                
summarized behaviour of PoW was “pick a leader every block time”, PoS is gonna try to do the                  
same without using complex computational problems. 
 
If in PoW nodes had more changes to be elected according to their computing power, in PoS                 
they will be picked according to something called “stake”, that represents how many resources              
they have invested in the blockchain. In cryptocurrencies, the stake is the proportion of coins               
held by that node. In IPchain, the stake could be, for example, the amount of ip prefixes a node                   
holds. The theory behind it is that the more stake a node has, the more it is interested in the                    
correct functioning of the system, since he’s the one that would lose the most if the system                 
stopped working or lost trust and the public decided not to use it. 
 
PoS systems are based in a pseudorandom number generator, that will generate a             
deterministic value every time a block must be created. This value will be the same for all the                  
nodes that have the same chain and have the same state. The system will provide a way to                  
elect a node based on the generated value, and it will keep in mind the stake of every node. A                    
29 
 summary of this mechanism would be: every time a block has to be created, a lottery is made,                  
where nodes have as many tickets as stake. Anyone could be elected, but nodes with higher                
stake have more chances to win the lottery. 
 
The elected node, called the validator, will have to sign the created block so everyone can                
validate that the proposed block has been created by the winner of the lottery. 
 
It is easier to enforce a block time, since we can directly control when a block is elected                  
through the lottery. We can ensure no node is elected until a certain time, which will be                 
calculated using the level of the node (the number of ancestors) and the initial date written in                 
the genesis block. 
5.2.2 Pros 
1) PoS blockchains are susceptible to 51% attacks, since a node that owns 51% of the               
stake is going to be the major voice driving the consensus of the system. In this model,                 
though, this actor would be the one who lost the most, so it wouldn’t make sense for                 
him to attack the network. 
2) If the stake is a valuable asset, it will be harder by a single node to control a big part of                     
it. Because the stake will be more distributed between than nodes than computational             
power would, the consensus is more decentralized that it would be in PoW. 
3) No need to consume large quantities of electricity in order to secure a blockchain. 
4) It has a more stable block time than PoW, since it is directly controlled through the                
lottery. 
5.2.3 Cons 
Figure 2: A forked blockchain 
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1) Because creating blocks has no real cost, there can be problems when there’s a fork in                
the chain (Figure 2), since nothing deters nodes from trying to create blocks for every               
branch of the chain. This is called the “Nothing at Stake” problem. In comparison,              
nodes on PoW would decide to pick a single one of the branches, the one they believe                 
to be correct, because the amount of resources they have is limited. 
This is relevant because if nodes vote for each branch of the chain they know, they are                 
actively preventing consensus from being achieved, and the chain could be           
hard-forked and never converge. This can be addressed with some mechanism that            
penalizes nodes that form blocks on multiple branches. 
 
5.3 Federated Byzantine Agreement 
The Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP) is a consensus algorithm proposed by Dr. Mazières on              
2015 [20] and belongs to a relatively new family of consensus algorithms called Federated              
Byzantine Agreement (FBA). In this section we will talk directly about SCP because at the               
moment is the only proven implementation of FBA that is truly decentralized.  
 
While FBA was pioneered by the Ripple blockchain, it requires a network owner that manages               
a list of nodes that can create blocks. This means Ripple is a permissioned blockchain, so we                 
won’t be able to use its model on IPchain. 
5.3.1 Explanation 
In blockchain, there’s a family of consensus algorithms that can achieve consensus through             
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) techniques. These techniques have been used on distributed            
systems for a long time, since they provide some resistance to ill-behaved nodes. Because              
blockchains are distributed systems, BFT techniques can be easily adopted as consensus            
algorithms.  
 
The basic mechanism of BFT consensus algorithms is that all nodes dispose of a list of validator                 
nodes. When consensus must be achieved, all validator nodes will propose blocks. Once blocks              
are proposed, all validator nodes will vote which is the block they want to add to the chain. If                   
there is any tie, new votes will be started with the tied options. Eventually, one block will be                  
elected and added to the chain. The problem with this kind of algorithms is that someone has                 
to maintain the list of validators, which usually leads to some sort of centralized control. FBA                
algorithms actively try to apply BFT techniques while truly maintaining the list of validators in a                
decentralized way. 
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In SCP, every node ​N defines something called “quorum slice”, which is a subset of nodes of                 
the entire system that also contains the node ​N itself. When a quorum slice (or simply slice)                 
agrees on the validity of a block, the node ​N that defined the slice believes their result and                  
goes along with it. A quorum slice is a subset that is enough to represent the consensus of the                   
entire system for the node ​N​. A node can have as many quorum slices as he wants, but only                   
requires one slice to reach consensus. We can see a visual representation of a FBA in Figure 3,                  
where each delimited area represents a slice. 
 
 
Figure 3: Quorum slices in FBA 
 
Because of the configuration of SCP, it prefers security over liveness. This means a node won’t                
be able to reach consensus until one of its slices agree on something. A consequence of this is                  
that nodes on FBA won’t see forks, they will always have one single chain. 
 
This doesn’t mean that forks can’t happen in FBA. Because quorum slices are defined by users,                
some troublesome scenarios can appear. In the following figures, nodes will be represented by              
circles and arrows will represent the slices of every node. 
 
● There is no intersection between the slices of two (or more) subgroups of the system.               
This would mean that chain from nodes v1,v2,v3 could easily fork from the chain from               
nodes v4,v5,v6, as their consensus mechanisms would be completely isolated. 
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Figure 4: Slices with no intersection 
 
● There is not enough nodes intersecting between the slices of two (or more) subgroups              
of the system. The intersecting nodes could easily behave maliciously and vote for             
different blocks in every subgroup, thus forcing a fork between the chain of each              
subgroup. 
 
 
Figure 5: Slices with ill-behaved intersection 
 
While nodes are free to pick their quorum slices, they have to be very cautious on the slices                  
they pick. If slices aren’t picked correctly, the security of the system could be compromised.               
There is also no easy way to know when the slices picked will provide safety to the system. 
 
In a lot of cases where FBA is applied, the majority of nodes will pick very similar slices, since                   
there will be some big actors on the system that everybody will trust (for example, if we were                  
using FBA to implement an interbank blockchain, most spanish users would trust the same              
banks: La Caixa, Banco Santander, Banc Sabadell, etc). The consequence would be that, since              
everyone would trust the big actors, those would be the ones that would drive the consensus                
forward, while other nodes simply accept their judgement. 
 
33 
 5.3.2 Pros 
1) Consensus is reached through voting and deciding which votes a node is going to trust.               
This sounds like a more democratic way to make decisions in a decentralized system              
than PoW and PoS. 
2) Because of previous point and the impossibility of forks on a single node, block time               
can be smaller than in other implementations. This means transactions in FBA will be              
processed a lot faster than in other consensus algorithms (3 to 5 seconds in SCP). 
5.3.2 Cons 
1) Creating slices is not easy. In theory nodes should form slices that represent their own               
trust relationships, but in practice a node will have to form slices that provide security               
to the system, so his trust relationships will be distorted for a greater good. 
2) The entire system is based in graph theory, so it isn’t as linear to code and test as other                   
consensus algorithms. 
6. Design 
In this section we will discuss the design of the consensus algorithm developed for IPchain. 
6.1 Discussion of researched algorithms 
The first step to designing our consensus protocol is framing it in one of the families previously                 
researched. We will first discuss each one of them separately, and we’ll finally reach a               
conclusion on the family of our consensus protocol. 
 
We first wanted to note that unlike cryptocurrencies, altering the state of IPchain will not               
provide a lot of benefits to a malicious party. Since IPchain will only act as a security layer for                   
BGP, he could simultaneously attack both IPchain and a BGP router to reroute traffic from a                
certain ip prefix to himself. This way, he could analyze the incoming traffic to that prefix and                 
negatively impact the true owner of the prefix, but he would have to spend a lot of resources                  
to do so, and he wouldn’t really obtain a lot in exchange, since the attack would be discovered                  
and fixed in a few hours. 
 
Also, ip prefixes are allocated in a block manner (as represented in Figure 6), where there’s a                 
central authority (IANA) that owns all the prefixes and distributes them in huge blocks to each                
RIR. RIRs allocate or delegate smaller blocks to ISP’s, whom can finally assign them to users. 
IPchain will mimic this distribution too, and one node representing IANA will own all the               
prefixes on the genesis block, and distribute them as new blocks are inserted. 
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Figure 6: IP address allocation hierarchy 
 
1) Proof-of-work: While PoW algorithms have been heavily tested, and we know for sure             
that they work, the fact that they require a huge amount of processing power and               
consume a lot of energy puts us off. Because attack IPchain doesn’t provide a lot of                
benefit, all the security layer provided by the mining of blocks isn’t really required.              
Because of these reasons, we would rather use any other consensus algorithm more             
fitting to IPchain requirements. 
 
2) Proof-of-stake: ​PoS keeps all the good bits of PoW, while removing the mining part. As               
we have discussed previously, mining was an inconvenience to us, so we are             
completely fine what that. We also believe that the stake concept maps perfectly to              
the ip prefixes we will be handling in IPchain. While PoS hasn’t been as heavily tested                
as PoW, there are some blockchain systems out there already using PoS consensus             
algorithms, so we can use those implementations as reference for our own. 
The only real problem with PoS is the “Nothing at Stake” problem, but we think it                
really isn’t that troubling in IPchain. On the first place, only actors that own some ip                
prefixes will be able to create blocks, as they will be the only ones that have some                 
stake. On the second place, because IPchain reflects real trust relationships (as seen in              
Figure 6), if an entity decided to act maliciously, he would be risking those              
relationships. It would also be easy for all the actors of the system to recognize who is                 
acting maliciously and ignoring their block proposals. 
 
3) Federated Byzantine Agreement: ​While FBA looked like a very promising concept, we            
believe that it’s still too new and some concepts need to be refined. As we have                
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 previously mentioned, we believe there’s a problem with the way quorum slices have             
to be selected, so nodes would have to make a choice: either they create slices that                
reflect their trust relationships or they create slices that make the system secure. We              
also believe that this consensus algorithm is too complex when compared to PoS, and              
doesn’t really provide a lot of benefits, since IPchain doesn’t really require a high              
throughput. 
 
After revising the researched consensus algorithms, we have decided to implement a            
protocol based in ​Proof-of-Stake​. 
6.2 The protocol 
 
Since the protocol we have designed to implement is a classic Proof-of-Stake, we have decided 
to summarize the entire protocol in a scheme, so we can clearly see how it works. We will dive 
into details once we start the implementation, for now we only need to clear a couple points: 
 
● We have added a max amount of time to wait for a block from the elected node. The 
timeout should give the validator enough time to recover from soft errors such as a 
bug in the code or small internet problems. 
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● It is possible that only some nodes receive a valid block, while others will skip this                
round and proceed to the next one. This means that forks could happen in this model,                
but given the fact that we are assuming all of the nodes in IPchain are               
well-intentioned, this is a really extreme situation. We have decided that at the             
moment, the only way to recover from a fork is restarting the node so he can catch up                  
with the correct ones. 
● If a round is skipped because a valid block was never received, we use a different                
mechanism to generate the following random number. This happens because the           
random number is generated from the current state of the chain, if we don’t add a                
new block the random number generated will be the same as the previous round. If we                
assume that the previous elected node didn’t create a block because he was             
unavailable, it doesn’t make sense to elect him as a leader again. We will explain this in                 
further detail on section 7.3. 
7. Implementation 
The most important part from our design is the generation of pseudorandom numbers (PRN).              
We require of a beacon that will generate a PRN that must be deterministic for a state of the                   
chain, so all nodes that are in the same chain will obtain the same PRN when consulting their                  
beacon. 
 
Implementing this pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) is a complex problem that           
requires knowledge of cryptography and other specialized areas. Since the author of the             
project has no such knowledge, we have decided to use to same scheme as DFINITY, a                
blockchain implementation that also uses Proof-of-Stake. We chose DFINITY because we had            
both the whitepaper [21] and the source code [22], so it was possible to implement the PRNG                 
by ourselves.  
 
We will now proceed to explain some building blocks which we have implemented and used               
for our consensus algorithm. 
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 7.1 Threshold signature 
7.1.1 Explanation 
A threshold signature is a cryptography primitive that works similar to public-key cryptography. 
 
Following the example in Figure 7, Alice can use public-key cryptography to generate a              
matching public and private key (p and s). She can then generate a message M and sign it with                   
her secret key s, producing a digital signature ​σ​. She can now send the pair of M and ​σ to                    
anyone else. Whomever receives the message can verify M and ​σ using the public key of                
Alice. 
 
 
Figure 7: Example of public-key cryptography 
 
While classic public-key cryptography is great, it is limited to a single sender. In certain cases,                
we want to send messages as a group. To avoid having a single member of the group                 
tampering with the message, we can have several members sending the digital signature of the               
message and asking the receiver to only trust the message once he has received N signatures.                
We will call this value N threshold. 
 
While the previously mentioned strategy would work, it is not very efficient and wouldn’t work               
for decentralized scenarios. This is where threshold signatures can help us. A threshold             
signature is a special way of doing multiple signatures where given a group of participants and                
a threshold, each one of them is going to receive a share, and a public key will be generated for                    
the group. In order to generate a valid signature to verify a message, the receiver needs to                 
collect ​threshold ​(or more) different signature shares and combine them. A signature share of              
a message can be generated by a user of the group signing the message with their share. An                  
example of threshold signature can be seen in Figure 8. 
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 Figure 8: Example of threshold signature 
7.1.2 Implementation 
In order to implement our PNRG we used a threshold signature scheme called BLS. We picked                
this one because it is unique, deterministic, non-interactive and DKG-friendly. 
 
● Deterministic: The signing function doesn’t use randomness and will always give the            
same result. 
● Unique: For every message and every public key there is only one signature that              
validates successfully. 
● Non-interactive: The process of creating the group signature involves only a single            
round of one-way communication for each of the participants. 
● DKG-friendly: It is possible to generate the keys required for the party without the help               
of a central authority. This will be explained in section 7.2.  
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 The IPchain codebase is written in Python, but no native implementation for BLS was found.               
Because of this, and also to avoid unexpected compatibility issues, we decided to use the same                
library DFINITY uses [23]. 
 
We had to fork the library, create some bindings and wrap it in a python library, so the                  
bindings can be replaced if a native implementation is ever built. 
 
Our BLS API provides the following functions: 
● genKeys(id): ​Create a matching pair of public and private/secret key (used as seeds for              
other operations). 
● share(secKey, threshold, ids):  ​Create shares for a defined group and threshold. 
● sign(msg, secKey): ​Create a digital signature for message ​msg​. 
● verify(msg, sig, pubKey):  ​Verify a message​ ​with the given signature and public key. 
● recover(ids, sigs): ​Generate the digital signature from the signature shares and the ids             
of those who generated them. 
● getPublicKey(sk): ​Get the matching public key of a secret key. 
● secretKeyShare(id, sKeys): ​Generate a share from an array of secret keys. 
● publicKeyShare(id, vVec): ​Generate a public key from a verification vector. 
● publicKeyIsEqual(pk1, pk2): ​Compares two public keys. 
● secretKeyAdd(sk1, sk2): ​Generates a secret key from two secret keys. 
● publicKeyAdd(pk1, pk2):  ​Generates a public key from two secret keys. 
 
A BLS sample program was created to test and validate how it works. 
 
 
#!/usr/bin/env python2.7 
 
import sys, os 
sys.path.append(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ​".."​)) 
import libs.bls_wrapper as bls 
 
 
def main(): 
 
    myId = 1234 
    m = ​"hello bls threshold signature" 
    ids = [ 1, 5, 3] 
    k = 2 
 
    sk, pk = bls.genKeys() 
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     ​if​ ​not​ sk: 
        print(​"Error initializing bls"​) 
        return 
 
    sm = bls.sign(m, sk) 
 
    ​if​ ​not​ bls.verify(m, sm, pk): 
        print(​"Error verifying initial message"​) 
        return 
 
   ​ shares ​= bls.share(sk, k, ids) 
 
    sigs = [] 
    ​for​ share ​in​ shares: 
        aux = bls.sign(m, share[​"sk"​]) 
        ​if​ ​not​ bls.verify(m, aux, share[​"pk"​]): 
            print(​"Error verifying message from id "​ + 
str(share[​"id"​])) 
            return 
 
        sigs.append(aux) 
 
    s = bls.recover(ids, sigs) 
    ​if​ ​not​ bls.verify(m, s, pk): 
        print(​"Recover failed"​) 
        return 
 
    print(​"Recover is OK"​) 
 
 
if​ __name__ == ​"__main__"​: 
    main() 
 
 
7.2 Distributed Key Generation 
7.2.1 Explanation 
Distributed key generation (DKG) is a process through which a threshold signature scheme can              
be completed for a group without the intervention of a centralized authority. Once the DKG is                
completed, every member will have a share and a public key for the group will be generated. 
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 7.2.2 Implementation 
DFINITY source code contains a library written in Javascript that provides primitives required to              
perform a DKG. Because the library was short, we ported it to Python. 
 
The DKG API provides the following functions: 
● generateContribution(threshold, ids): ​it will generate a contribution for every id and a            
verification vector used to verify those contributions. 
● verifyContributionShare(id, contribution, vVec): ​it will verify that the contribution sent          
by the node ​id ​is correct, using a verification vector. 
● generateShare(contributions): ​it will combine several contributions to generate a         
share for the local node. 
● addVerificationVectors(vVecs): ​it will combine several verification vectors to generate         
the public key of the group. 
A DKG sample program was created to test and validate how it works. This program emulates a                 
distributed network but is actually executed in a single machine to simplify the testing. 
 
 
#!/usr/bin/env python2.7 
 
import sys, os 
sys.path.append(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ​".."​)) 
import libs.bls_wrapper as bls 
import dkg as dkg 
from​ random import randint 
import argparse 
 
def dkgSetup(ids, threshold): 
    members = [] 
    ​for​ member ​in​ ids: 
        secKey, _ = bls.genKeys(member) 
        members.append({ 
            ​"originalId"​: member, 
            ​"id"​: secKey, 
            ​"receivedShares"​: [], 
            ​"secretKeyShare"​: None 
        }) 
 
    print(​"Beginning the secret instantation round..."​) 
    print(​"\tUsing members: "​ + ​" "​.join(map(str, ids))) 
    print(​"\tUsing threshold of: "​ + str(threshold)) 
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     vVecs = [] 
    ​for​ _ ​in​ members: 
        verificationVector, secretKeyContribution = 
dkg.generateContribution(threshold, [ m[​"id"​] ​for​ m ​in​ members ] ) 
        vVecs.append(verificationVector) 
 
        ​for​ i, contrib ​in​ enumerate(secretKeyContribution): 
            member = members[i] 
            b = dkg.verifyContributionShare(member[​"id"​], contrib, 
verificationVector) 
            ​if​ ​not​ b: 
                print(​"Invalid share!"​) 
                return 
 
            member[​"receivedShares"​].append(contrib) 
 
    ​for​ member ​in​ members: 
        sk = dkg.addContributionShares(member[​"receivedShares"​]) 
        member[​"secretKeyShare"​] = sk 
 
    print(​"-> Secret shares have been generated"​) 
 
    groupsvVec = dkg.addVerificationVectors(vVecs) 
    print(​"-> Verification vector computed"​) 
    print(​"Resulting group public key is "​ + (groupsvVec[0]) + ​"\n"​) 
 
    return members, groupsvVec 
 
def dkgTest(msg, members, vVec, threshold): 
    groupsPk = vVec[0] 
    sigs = [] 
    signerIds = [] 
 
    print(​"Testing signature on message \""​ + msg + ​"\""​) 
 
    ​while​ len(sigs) < threshold: 
        i = randint(0, len(members)-1) 
        ​if​ members[i][​"id"​] ​in​ signerIds: 
            continue 
 
        skShare = members[i][​"secretKeyShare"​] 
        print(​"-> Member "​ + str(members[i][​"originalId"​]) + ​" signs 
with share: "​ + skShare) 
        sig = bls.sign(msg, skShare) 
        sigs.append(sig) 
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         signerIds.append(members[i][​"id"​]) 
 
    groupsSig = bls.recover(signerIds, sigs) 
    print(​"Resulting sig: "​ + groupsSig) 
 
    verified = bls.verify(msg, groupsSig, groupsPk) 
    print((​"\033[92m"​ ​if​ verified ​else​ ​"\033[91mNOT "​) + ​"VERIFIED 
\033[0m\n"​) 
 
    return groupsSig 
 
def main(): 
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() 
    parser.add_argument(​"-m"​, ​help​=​"Ids of members of the dkg"​, 
nargs​=​"*"​, default=[ 10314, 30911, 25411, 8608, 31524, 15441, 
23399], ​type​=int) 
    parser.add_argument(​"-th"​, ​help​=​"Threshold of the threshold 
signature that will be setup"​, ​nargs​=​"?"​, ​type​=int) 
    parser.add_argument(​"-rr"​, ​help​=​"Amount of times a dkg round 
will be repeated (for the same message)"​, ​nargs​=​"?"​, ​default​=2, 
type​=int) 
    parser.add_argument(​"-nr"​, ​help​=​"Amount of rounds, where the 
message from the previous round will be signed"​, ​nargs​=​"?"​, 
default​=5, ​type​=int) 
    args = parser.parse_args() 
 
    ids = args.m 
    threshold = args.th ​if​ args.th ​else​ len(ids)/2 + len(ids)%2 
    numRounds = args.nr 
    roundRepeat = args.rr 
 
    members, vVec = dkgSetup(ids, threshold) 
 
    msg = ​"This is a dkg sample" 
    ​for​ i ​in​ range(numRounds): 
        print(​"ROUND "​ + str(i+1)) 
        print(​"----------------------------------------"​) 
        roundMsg = msg 
        ​for​ j ​in​ range(roundRepeat): 
            msg = dkgTest(roundMsg, members, vVec, threshold) 
 
 
if​ __name__ == ​"__main__"​: 
    main() 
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This program will setup a DKG between members 10314, 30911, 25411, 8608, 31524, 15441              
and 23399, then all members will sign an initial hardcoded message with their shares, we will                
collect all the signature shares and validate them using the groups public key. 
 
We will execute the sample twice (Figures 9 and 10), repeating the same process twice for                
every DKG setup, so we can point out a couple interesting points on the DKG behaviour. 
1) Every time a DKG is completed, the group public key and the shares of every node are                 
different (they are random values). The resulting digital signature of the original            
message is different too. 
2) No matter which signature shares we recover, the resulting digital signature is always             
the same. 
 
 
Figures 9 and 10: Executions of DKG sample 
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 7.3 Pseudorandom number generation 
Now that BLS and DKG have been explained and implemented, we can explain how the PRNG                
works. In order to generate PRN we first need to run a DKG process to setup our blockchain                  
system.  
 
Once the DKG is completed, the system is ready to generate random numbers. 
To generate a random number we will use the signature of the last block in the chain. The                  
process is described in the following scheme: 
 
 
 
The final signature share will be verified using the groups public key. If this verification fails                
after all the signature shares have been received it means that there are not enough nodes                
that have the same chain state as the node that is trying to generate a random number. At this                   
point, all the node can do is restart to try to recover. Some improvements to this process will                  
be discussed in section 10. 
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 To setup a DKG, we need to define a list of members that will participate in the process. Given 
the facts that some members could be disconnected at the time of DKG and that the 
blockchain is public and new members could appear at any time, the DKG cannot be definitive. 
In order to eventually include these members, a new DKG has to be done every certain time. 
This is a configuration parameter that will be discussed in section 8.2. 
 
The time the DKG will require will scale linearly with the amount of participating members. 
Because of this, the amount of members that will be used is a configuration parameter that 
will be discussed in section 8.2. 
 
Completing a DKG will provide the participating members with the group public key, but we 
need a way for members that haven’t participated in the DKG to know this public key. We will 
use the blockchain to do this: when a DKG is completed, a special block containing the groups 
public key will be inserted into the blockchain. The responsible of creating this block will be 
one node randomly selected from all the participating members of the DKG.  
 
As an added feature, every node that participated in the DKG will store their share locally with 
some sort of encryption. This way, if the node needs to restart, it can recover its state.  
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 8. Results 
We have had an unexpected problem with the planning of this project. We never considered               
the generation of pseudorandom numbers in a distributed environment, since at the time of              
the planning we did not know how Proof-of-Stake consensus algorithms worked, but it proved              
to be a topic as complex as the implementation of a consensus algorithm. Since these are                
state-of-the-art techniques that extensively use advanced cryptography, and the author is not            
an expert in these fields, the adaptation of DKG and BLS took more time than expected. This                 
meant we didn’t have enough time to implement all this model in the IPchain codebase. 
 
Instead, we have decided to build prototypes that will allow us to test our design. Another                
developer will have to integrate our prototype into IPchain. 
 
Our prototype has been built following the DKG sample appended in section 7.2. In order to                
emulate a P2P network, we have built a broker using a networking library called ZeroMQ.               
Messages are sent through TCP. We also implemented a CLI that allows us to decide when to                 
setup a DKG or generate a new random number. 
 
This is the prototype code that represents one node: 
 
#!/usr/bin/env python2.7 
 
import​ sys, os 
sys.path.append(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ​"../.."​)) 
import​ libs.bls_wrapper ​as​ bls 
import​ dkg ​as​ dkg 
import​ zmq 
import​ signal 
import​ json 
import​ argparse 
import​ logger 
 
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal.SIG_DFL); 
 
log = ​None 
sk = ​None 
groupPk = ​None 
state = ​"ipchain" 
sigs = ​None 
sigIds = ​None 
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 addrs = {} 
brokerAddr = ​None 
 
 
def​ ​init​(oid, threshold, pport, sport): 
    ​global​ log, sk, addrs, brokerAddr 
    log = logger.setup_custom_logger(str(oid)) 
    members = {} 
    oids = [] 
 
    ​for​ line ​in​ open(​"examples/tcp-utils/members.txt"​).readlines(): 
        lines = line.split(​' '​) 
        id = int(lines[​0​]) 
        addr = lines[​1​].rstrip(​"\n"​) 
        oids.append(id) 
        ​if​ ​not​ brokerAddr: 
            brokerAddr = addr 
        addrs[id] = addr 
 
    ctx = zmq.Context() 
    sub = ctx.socket(zmq.SUB) 
    sub.connect(​"tcp://%s:%s"​ % (brokerAddr, sport)) 
    sub.setsockopt(zmq.SUBSCRIBE, ​""​) 
 
    pub = ctx.socket(zmq.PUB) 
    pub.connect(​"tcp://%s:%s"​ % (brokerAddr, pport)) 
 
    socket = ctx.socket(zmq.REP) 
    socket.bind(​"tcp://*:%s"​ % oid) 
 
    poller = zmq.Poller() 
    poller.register(socket, zmq.POLLIN) 
    poller.register(sub, zmq.POLLIN) 
 
    end = ​False 
 
    log.info(​"%d: Started communications..."​ % oid) 
    ​while​ ​not​ end: 
        socks = dict(poller.poll()) 
        ​if​ sub ​in​ socks ​and​ socks[sub] == zmq.POLLIN: 
            msg = sub.recv() 
            type = msg.split(​"_"​, ​1​)[​0​] 
            ​if​ type == ​"setup"​: 
                setup(members, oid, oids, threshold) 
            ​elif​ type == ​"randomNum"​ ​and​ sk ​is​ ​not​ ​None​: 
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                     pub.send(genNewSig(oid)) 
            ​elif​ type == ​"sig"​: 
                handleSig(json.loads(msg.split(​"_"​, ​1​)[​1​]), 
threshold, members) 
 
        ​if​ socket ​in​ socks ​and​ socks[socket] == zmq.POLLIN: 
            msg = json.loads(socket.recv()) 
            topic = msg[​"topic"​] 
            ​if​ topic == ​"contrib"​: 
                receiveContribution(msg, members, oid) 
                socket.send(​"OK"​) 
 
def​ ​genNewSig​(m_oid): 
    ​global​ state, sk, sigs, sigIds 
    sig = bls.sign(state, sk) 
    sigs = [] 
    sigIds = [] 
 
    ​return​ (​"sig_"​ + json.dumps({ 
            ​"oid"​: m_oid, 
            ​"sig"​: sig 
        })) 
 
def​ ​handleSig​(msg, threshold, members): 
    ​global​ sigs, groupPk, state, sigIds 
 
    ​if​ ​not​ groupPk: 
        ​return 
 
    sigs.append(msg[​"sig"​]); 
    sigIds.append(members[msg[​"oid"​]][​"id"​]); 
 
    log.info(​"Received secretShare %s"​ % msg[​"sig"​]) 
 
    ​if​ (len(sigs) >= threshold): 
        groupsSig = bls.recover(sigIds, sigs) 
 
        ​if​ bls.verify(state, groupsSig, groupPk): 
            state = groupsSig 
            log.info(​"Verified sig %s. Updating state..."​ % 
groupsSig) 
 
def​ ​receiveContribution​(msg, members, m_oid): 
    oid = msg[​"oid"​] 
    contrib = msg[​"contrib"​] 
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     vVec = msg[​"vvec"​] 
 
    ​if​ dkg.verifyContributionShare(members[m_oid][​"id"​], contrib, 
vVec): 
        members[oid][​"receivedShare"​] = contrib 
        members[oid][​"vvec"​] = vVec 
        log.info(​"Received valid share from member %s"​ % oid) 
    ​else​: 
        log.info(​"Received invalid share from member %s"​ % oid) 
 
    ​if​ allSharesReceived(members): 
        ​global​ sk, groupPk 
        sk = dkg.addContributionShares( [ member[​"receivedShare"​] 
for​ _,member ​in​ members.iteritems() ]) 
        groupsvVec = dkg.addVerificationVectors( [ member[​"vvec"​] 
for​ _,member ​in​ members.iteritems() ]) 
        groupPk = groupsvVec[​0​] 
        log.info(​"DKG setup completed"​) 
        log.info(​"Resulting group public key is "​ + groupPk + ​"\n"​) 
 
def​ ​setup​(members, m_oid, oids, threshold): 
    members.clear() 
    ​for​ oid ​in​ oids: 
        secKey, _ = bls.genKeys(oid) 
        members[oid] = { 
            ​"id"​: secKey, 
            ​"receivedShare"​: ​None​, 
            ​"vvec"​: ​None 
        } 
 
    vVec, skContrib = dkg.generateContribution(threshold, 
                                               [ member[​"id"​] ​for 
_,member ​in​ members.iteritems() ] ) 
 
    i = ​0 
    ​for​ oid, member ​in​ members.iteritems(): 
        ​if​ oid == m_oid: 
            members[m_oid][​"vvec"​] = vVec 
            members[m_oid][​"receivedShare"​] = skContrib[i] 
        ​else​: 
            sendMsg(oid, { 
                ​"oid"​: m_oid, 
                ​"vvec"​: vVec, 
                ​"topic"​: ​"contrib"​, 
                ​"contrib"​: skContrib[i] 
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             }) 
        i += ​1 
 
def​ ​allSharesReceived​(members): 
    ​for​ _,member ​in​ members.iteritems(): 
        ​if​ ​not​ member[​"receivedShare"​]: 
            ​return​ ​False 
 
    ​return​ ​True 
 
def​ ​sendMsg​(to, data): 
    ​global​ addrs 
    context = zmq.Context() 
    socket = context.socket(zmq.REQ) 
    socket.connect(​"tcp://%s:%d"​ % (addrs[to], to)) 
    socket.send(json.dumps(data), zmq.NOBLOCK); 
 
if​ __name__ == ​"__main__"​: 
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() 
    parser.add_argument(​"-id"​, help=​"Id of this node"​, 
required=​True​, type=int) 
    parser.add_argument(​"-s"​, help=​"Subscribe broker socket"​, 
required=​True​, type=int) 
    parser.add_argument(​"-p"​, help=​"Publish broker socket"​, 
required=​True​, type=int) 
    parser.add_argument(​"-t"​, help=​"Threshold"​, required=​True​, 
type=int) 
    args = parser.parse_args() 
    init(args.id, args.t, args.p, args.s) 
 
 
8.1 Performance 
Ideally we would dispose of hundreds of computers to test our prototype. Unluckily, we only               
have five computers with a two core processor each one. To run our tests we will host several                  
nodes in a single machine, so we will have to adapt the way we gather and interpret statistics. 
 
While the statistics we gather can’t be taken very seriously, they will give us an idea of the real                   
results we would get in a distributed system formed of a lot of computers. 
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 8.1.1 Time to setup DKG 
Analyzing the prototype code, we can see that when a node does a DKG setup with ​N members                  
and a threshold ​k​, it generates ​N ​contributions and sends one contribution to every other               
member of the group (so it sends ​N messages). Once he has received ​N ​contributions and                
verification vectors, it combines them all to generate one share and the groups public key. 
We have observed that the group public key computation is a cpu-intensive operation, and if               
we try to perform it once for every member hosted in the machine, the setup DKG time                 
increases heavily. This happens because there are only two cores on the machine, so the group                
public key computations of all the nodes are performed sequentially (there are only two              
parallel executions). In order to fix this, we will still send ​N ​contributions per node hosted on a                  
machine, but we will modify the code so that only one of those nodes will perform the                 
posterior computations. 
 
Also, because some nodes will be in the same machine, the latency from sending a tcp package                 
to the localhost will be less than 1 ms. If the nodes were in different machines, the latency                  
would be between 30 and 100 ms. This difference in latency wouldn’t really affect the time to                 
setup DKG greatly because it will only affect the time that it takes to distribute the                
contributions, so we won’t take it into account. We expect this difference to be compensated               
by the fact that only two cores are used to process the amount of messages of a lot of nodes. 
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 8.1.2 Time to generate random number 
 
 
8.2 Parameter recommendations 
In this section we will discuss some configuration parameters that will alter the functioning of               
the blockchain. 
 
8.2.1 Duration of the DKG setup 
Because the participating members must be defined when doing a DKG, nodes connected after              
the DKG is completed or nodes that were disconnected during the setup won’t be able to                
participate in the PRNG process. We believe that the DKG should be performed again after a                
certain number of blocks to include these new nodes. This amount of blocks will depend on the                 
block time of the system. At the moment, the block time is 5 minutes, so we believe the DKG                   
should be performed again after 50 blocks. 
 
We picked 50 because this is roughly once every 6 hours, which is often enough for nodes to                  
adhere to the PRNG process, but not too often to interfere with the consensus. 
8.2.2 Amount of participant members on DKG 
We should pick a value for this parameter that gives us a DKG setup time lower than the block                   
time of the system. We should also keep in mind that the higher the amount of participants,                 
the higher the chance to have some problem when doing the DKG. We can use the results of                  
section 8.1.1 for this decision. 
 
We believe that 100 is a good number, since the doing a DKG setup should be safe enough, but                   
it still represents a representative chunk of the IPchain expected population. 
8.2.3 Threshold 
This value must be expressed as a percentage, and it represents the amount of shares from the                 
same state a node must receive in order to generate a pseudorandom number. The higher this                
value is, the most improbable forks will be, but setting it too high could impact the ability to                  
reach consensus (for example, at 100%, every time one node has a network problem or               
disconnects, consensus will be impossible). 
 
If a node doesn’t reach this threshold, he won’t be able to generate a PRN and will be stuck                   
until restart. Good values could be 51% and 66%. 
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 9. Conclusions 
The objectives of this project were: 
 
● Study the currently known, tested and proved consensus algorithms that are used in             
blockchain solutions, identify their trade-offs and determine which one fulfills the           
requirements of IPchain the most. 
● Study the existing IPchain codebase and implement the designed consensus algorithm           
on it. 
● Test the implemented consensus algorithm, verifying it works correctly for an           
emulation of the BGP protocol. Also verify that non-functional requirements are           
fulfilled. 
 
We believe this report contains a summary of the most relevant consensus algorithms at this               
time. We have also described their trade-offs and decided that Proof-of-Stake was the one that               
accommodated the needs of IPchain the most. 
 
A consensus algorithm that fits the needs of IPchain has been successfully designed, and a               
prototype has been built. Unfortunately, it hasn’t been possible to implement the consensus             
algorithm in the existing codebase of IPchain, but the hardest part is already completed.              
Another developer will have to integrate the results of this project. 
 
It hasn’t been possible to test our consensus algorithm in an emulation of the BGP protocol,                
because we haven’t been able to implement the blockchain itself. We have used a prototype               
to verify that our design fulfills the non-functional requirements of IPchain (good enough             
performance, can adjust to desired block-time, …). 
 
Overall, we think we have a done a pretty good job with this project, although it could have                  
gone slightly better. 
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 10. Future improvements 
In this section we will describe some things that could be improved on the design described in                 
this report. They were not implemented because they took too much time and the problem               
they solved wasn’t important enough. 
 
● Right now, if a node forks from others, he won’t be able to recover its state to match                  
the main chain. In order to fix this, the node must be restarted. It would be nice to                  
provide an alternative to this. 
● Because blockchain nodes use P2P to communicate, all the nodes can see every             
message. There are certain messages that have a single receiver, so they should be              
encrypted using public-key cryptography. We know that contributions should be          
encrypted, but there might be other messages that need encryption too. 
● A public key for the contribution generated by a node can be obtained through the               
verification vector of that node. If we knew how to obtain this public key, we would be                 
able to validate the signature shares received, so the entire PRNG process would be a               
bit more robust. We think DFINITY does this too, so the answer should be in their                
source code. 
● To further prevent the “Nothing-at-Stake” problem, it could be a nice idea to record              
somewhere if a node is detected to be validating blocks for several branches of the               
chain at the same time.  
● An improvement to the DKG setup would be taking the chain state into account. This               
way, if a node completes the DKG setup correctly, it knows for sure there are enough                
nodes with the same state, so he should be able to generate a valid signature share.                
Also, the amount of signature shares from nodes with a different chain will be              
reduced. This would make the PRNG process slightly more robust. 
● Because of a limitation in the BLS library we use, we can only use integer node                
identifiers to setup the DKG. This is troublesome because the identifiers on the actual              
codebase are 40 byte long hex strings. Some information needs to be lost, because              
integers are 32 bytes. There’s a chance two different hex strings are casted to the               
same integer, which will give problems with the threshold signature scheme. To fix             
this, we need to dive deep into the BLS library and understand how it works.  
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